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SEXUAL STERILIZATION-CONSTITUTIONAL
VALIDITY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION AND
CONSENT DETERMINATIVE OF VOLUNTARINESS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973 Minnie and Mary Alice Relf, ages fourteen and twelve,
were sterilized under the auspices of a federally funded family plan-
ning program,' allegedly without the consent of their parents.2 Pub-
lic disclosure of the incident touched off a controversy of national
impact. A $1,000,000 damage suit was filed; the Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) announced
that no more federal funds could be spent on sterilizing minors and
mentally incompetent adults; and the Health Subcommittee of the
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee held hearings on the
sterilizations.3 Subsequently, HEW published guidelines governing
sterilizations under federally funded programs.' These guidelines
were later invalidated on the ground that the family planning sec-
tions of the Social Security Act5 and the Public Health Service Act6
did not provide statutory authority to fund the sterilization of any
person incompetent under state law to consent to such an operation,
because of minority or mental disability.7
The publicity surrounding the sterilization of the Relf sisters
focused public attention on what has become a relatively common
practice. In the last few years, an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 low-
income persons have been sterilized annually under federally
funded programs.' The sterilization of individuals is not, however,
a practice confined to federally funded programs; many states have
involuntary sterilization9 laws applicable to mentally handicapped
1. The sterilization operations were arranged by the Montgomery County Community
Action Agency which was funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity. The Community
Action Agency is the largest provider of family planning services in Montgomery County, and
the sterilizations were carried out as part of its family planning services. 2 FAMmY PLANNING
/PoPULATION REP. 77 (1973).
2. The Agency contended that the operations were carried out with the written consent
of the girls' illiterate mother. The mother, on the other hand, contended that she only gave
permission for shots to be administered to her daughters. The father of the girls was never
contacted by the Agency. 2 FAMILY PLANNING/POPULATION REP. 77 (1973).
3. 2 FAMILY PLANNING/POPULATION REP. 77 (1973).
4. 39 Fed. Reg. 4730-34 (1974).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 703(a) (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(15), 1396d(a)(vi)(4) (Supp. I1, 1973).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-5 (1970).
7. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974).
8. Id. at 1199.
9. Involuntary sterilization is the sterilization of an individual without the individual's
1
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individuals and criminals.'0 These laws are an outgrowth of the
eugenics movement" that swept the United States in the late 1800's
and early 1900's and which culminated in the passage of the first
involuntary sterilization law in Indiana in 1907.12 Although the eu-
genics movement is no longer popular, 3 the involuntary sterilization
laws which it produced are still in effect.'4 Furthermore, several
courts have been confronted with the issue of the legality of involun-
tary sterilization in states not having statutes expressly authorizing
such sterilizations.' 5
The proponents of eugenics contend that sterilization pursuant
to a comprehensive eugenics program counteracts the alleged deteri-
oration in the quality of man.'6 Sterilization is also advocated as a
method to stem the population crisis and its adverse economic ef-
fects. " However, complex legal issues must be resolved before steri-
lization programs should be undertaken. The legal issues concerning
sterilization include: (1) the validity of state legislation compelling
the involuntary sterilization of specified classes of individuals; (2)
a determination of what constitutes consent to voluntary steriliza-
tion; (3) the effectiveness of consent by parents or guardians to the
sterilization of minors and mental incompetents; and (4) the effect
of coercion in obtaining the consent of the individual to be steri-
lized. These issues will be the subject of this comment. At the outset
it should be acknowledged that many issues in the sterilization area
consent, often under compulsion exerted by a state or federal administrative or adjudicatory
body.
10. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN., § 59-501 (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 17-19 (Supp.
1974); GA. CODE ANN., § 84-933 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT., § § 35-39 to 35-43 (Supp. 1974);
OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43A, § 341 (1954); ORE. REv. STAT., § 436.050-.070 (1973); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 64-10-1 to 64-10-7 (1968).
11. Eugenics is the concept or science of improving human qualities through the regula-
tion of heredity. See Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DENVER L.J. 631
(1969); Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues
of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189 (1971).
12. Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DEN. L.J. 631 (1969).
13. A scientific dispute over the validity of the theories on which eugenic programs were
based and the sterilization of hundreds of thousands and the murder of millions for suppos-
edly eugenic purposes by Nazi Germany led to public hostility toward eugenic ideas. Vukow-
ich, supra note 11.
14. See statutes cited note 10 supra.
15. E.g., Wade v. Bethesda Hospital, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Guardianship
of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579
(Ky. App. 1968); In the Interest of M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. En Bane 1974); Frazier v.
Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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have not been finally, resolved; analogy to comparable legal areas,
however, indicates the probable resolution of these issues. The va-
lidity of the conclusions must necessarily depend on the validity of
the analogies on which they are based.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION
A. The Standard For Regulating
The right to have children has been described as a basic civil
right. 8 Sterilization irreversibly prevents an individual from having
children. 9 Involuntary sterilization under state law2 or any other
scheme deprives the individual of the freedom to choose whether to
have children. Involuntary sterilization laws which deprive certain
classes of individuals of this basic right, while leaving others free
from such deprivation, may be subject to the objection that they
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Roe v. Wade,2' the United States Supreme Court determined
that "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of personal privacy, does exist under the Constitution. '2
These zones of personal privacy encompass fundamental rights2
18. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
19. Vasectomy is the most common sterilization procedure for a male. This operation
is a relatively uncomplicated surgical procedure which takes less than an hour to perform.
The recuperative period is often not more than one day. The operation does not prevent the
male from engaging in coitus. Generally, the procedure is considered irreversible but there
may be a 30 to 40 percent chance for reversal if desired. 21 Am. JUR. P.O.F. Sexual
Sterilization §§ 6-8 (1968). For the female, sterilization involves a more complicated proce-
dure. The most common surgical techniques for the female involve major surgery, requiring
the opening of the abdominal cavity under general anesthesia. Many doctors feel the danger
is limited and statistics indicate a death rate of only one per thousand operations. A recent
development, laparoscopy, utilizes a surgical instrument inserted through a small incision.
This can be done on an outpatient basis with local anesthesia. Either surgical method accom-
plishes tubal ligation of which there are 100 variations. Tubal ligation is also generally
considered irreversible and statistics indicate less chance for reversal than for the male who
undergoes a vasectomy. 21 AM. Jun. P.O.F. Sexual Sterilization §§ 12-14 (1968).
20. See statutes cited note 10 supra.
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. Id. at 152. As for the constitutional provision from which these zones or rights of
personal privacy arise, the Court said:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.
Id. at 153.
23. Id. at 152.
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and include the decision whether to have children 4 and the right to
have children.- Involuntary sterilization deprives the individual of
these constitutionally protected fundamental rights. Constitutional
protection, of course, is not an absolute prohibition of governmental
deprivation or regulation of a fundamental right. A state may de-
prive or regulate the exercise of such a right if there is a compelling
state interest in so doing.2"
There is initially a question whether a compelling state interest
standard should apply to all involuntary sterilization programs.
Bills have been introduced into various state legislatures requiring
sterilization as a. condition for receiving public assistance. 27 If a
scheme requires involuntary sterilization as a condition to receiving
public assistance benefits,28 then there is an argument for conclud-
ing that a compelling state interest standard is not required. In
Dandridge v. Williams,2" the Supreme Court upheld a Maryland
maximum grant regulation which placed an upper limit on the
amount of Aid to Families with Dependent Children payments a
family unit could receive. The maximum grant regulation was based
on the number of children in the family, and it was contended that
this discrimination based on family size violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The Court concluded that in the area of social welfare
and economics, the classifications formulated must only have a
"reasonable basis" to meet the requirements of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The Court stated that it would not second guess a
state's allocation of welfare funds.
If this analysis is applied to a state scheme for involuntary
sterilization pursuant to its public assistance program, then only a
"reasonable basis" would be needed for requiring sterilization as a
condition for receiving public assistance benefits which is simply
social welfare legislation allocating available benefits.
The Dandridge "reasonable basis" rationale should not be ap-
plied to allow involuntary sterilization pursuant to a public assis-
tance program, or any other program of involuntary sterilization. In
Dandridge, the Court stated that it was only dealing with a state
regulation in the social and economic field which did not affect
24. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text infra.
28. See pt. IV(B) of this comment.
29. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
[Vol. 40
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freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights."0 When involuntarily
sterilized, the individual is irreversibly denied the fundamental
rights to have children and to decide to have children, '31 and the
Supreme Court has held that these fundamental rights may only be
denied to achieve a compelling state interest.2
B. Statutory Guidelines and Procedural Protections
The right to decide whether to have children is a liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3
The deprivation of that right by involuntary sterilization must be
accompanied by procedures consistent with due process.
Given a compelling state interest, procedural safeguards are
necessary to protect the individual from arbitrary and capricious
state regulation or deprivation of fundamental rights. As a general
proposition, a state may only order an individual to be involuntarily
sterilized pursuant to a valid statute.34 Legislation affecting a fun-
damental right must be "narrowly drawn to express only the legiti-
mate state interest at stake"35 and must not needlessly impinge
upon the exercise of the fundamental right.3 6 The state must estab-
lish objective standards for the deprivation of a fundamental right 37
and may not allow individuals to be sterilized in the unfettered
30. Id. at 484.
31. See cases cited notes 24 and 25 supra.
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But cf. In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d
171 (1968).
33. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
34. Wade v. Bethesda Hospital, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Guardianship of
Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky.
App. 1968); In the Interest of M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. En Banc 1974); Frazier v. Levi,
440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
36. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
37. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). In this case, the Supreme Court
invalidated a Pennsylvania statute that allowed the jury in a criminal case to impose the costs
of prosecution on an acquitted defendant, but did not provide standards as to when it should
or should not impose coslts. If the defendant did not pay the costs imposed, then he was
imprisoned. The Court said that Pennsylvania had provided a procedure to deprive an acquit-
ted defendent of his liberty and property, and this procedure was
* * * invalid under the Due Process Clause because of vagueness and the absence
of any standards sufficient to enable defendants to protect themselves against
arbitrary and discriminatory impositions of costs.
Id. at 402. See also Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973); In the Interest of
M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
Specific and objective standards are necessary to meet the mandate that state legislation
interfering with fundamental rights must be "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interest at stake." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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discretion of administrative or adjudicatory bodies responsible for
implementing the sterilization procedure. 38 If reasonable objective
standards are absent, the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
For example, a Connecticut statute allows the sterilization of
individuals in the state's training schools if "procreation. . .would
be inadvisable because he is incapable of comprehending the conse-
quences of his actions."39 As a statutory standard, this statute ap-
pears clearly inadequate. First, it does not address any compelling
state interest; second, it fails to establish any guidelines for deter-
mining whether the individual lacks the requisite capacity to com-
prehend his actions.
Admittedly, all discretion cannot be denied the administrative
or adjudicatory body that is to determine whether a particular indi-
vidual is to be sterilized. Too much discretion, however, should not
be allowed. The Connecticut statute provides for sterilization "if in
the judgment of a majority" of the adjudicatory body, the individ-
ual fulfills the statutory criteria." This statute may allow too much
discretion; the statute can be drawn in more narrow terms. For
example, if the compelling state interest is the prevention of incom-
petence,4 the statute should require a finding by the adjudicatory
body that the individual will engage in sexual intercourse and that
there is a fifty per cent chance (or other specified probability) that
the individual will produce mentally deficient offspring if procrea-
tion should result. This standard requires an objective finding based
on the inheritability of the individual's particular mental defi-
ciency.
A statutory scheme infringing upon a constitutionally protected
freedom or right will only be upheld if the scheme is necessary to
accomplish a permissible state interest.42 The statutory scheme for
accomplishing the state objective should not be upheld if there are
less drastic alternatives available. 3 Involuntary sterilization is an
absolute denial44 of a fundamental right; it should only be allowed
when there is no less drastic alternative available. Oral contracep-
tives, for example, administered as a part of an institutionalized
38. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
39. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV., § 17-19 (Supp. 1974).
40. Id.
41. See pt. M (A) of this comment.
42. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
43. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); Lessard v, Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
44. See note 19 supra.
[Vol. 40
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program of care for the mentally handicapped might be an effective
alternative to sterilization, although, sterilization might be the only
effective contraceptive method available for a noninstitutionalized
individual. Nevertheless, any statutory scheme should require an
investigation into the alternatives to sterilization and a finding that
the available alternatives are unsuitable.
Finally, procedures consistent with due process should include
a hearing to determine whether the particular individual should be
sterilized . 5 In addition, notice of the hearing should be served on
the individual or the individual's guardian in time to allow the party
or his guardian to prepare for the hearing; a guardian ad litem
should be appointed for incompetent individuals; and, some provi-
sion should be made to allow an appeal of the sterilization order.4"
Il. COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS JUSTIFYING INVOLUNTARY
STERILIZATION OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED47
Several states have involuntary sterilization laws applicable to
the mentally handicapped." To justify the denial of a handicapped
individual's fundamental rights, these statutes must further a com-
pelling state interest.
A. Inheritability
In 1927, in Buck v. Bell,49 the validity of a Virginia statute
providing for the sterilization of mentally handicapped individuals
with inheritable forms of mental deficiency was upheld. The Su-
preme Court concluded that the sterilization of the mentally handi-
capped was a valid exercise of the state's police power "to prevent
our being swamped with incompetence."5 Obviously, the basis for
concluding that sterilization would reduce incompetence was the
assumption that mental deficiency is hereditary. However, with the
advance in the study of genetics, the validity of that assumption is
no longer clear. Certainly, not all forms of mental abnormalities are
45. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), requiring a hearing on "fitness as a parent"
before an unwed father could be deprived of the custody of his children.
46. In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), these procedures were approved as providing
due process of law.
47. "Mentally handicapped" and "mentally incompetent" will be used in this paper
as generic terms to encompass all forms of mental retardation and mental illness.
48. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN., § 59-501 (1971); GA. CODE ANN., § 84-933 (Supp. 1971); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 35-39 (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43A, § 341 (1954); ORE. REV. STAT.,
§§ 436.050-.070 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN., §§ 64-10-1 to 64-10-7 (1968).
49. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
50. Id. at 207.
1975]
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inheritable 51 and genetic causes for others have not been established
with reasonable medical certainty. 5 For example, psychotic and
neurotic illnesses, sometimes characterized simply as insanity, are
considered to be of developmental or environmental origin. 3 Certain
mental and physical conditions such as amaurotic idiocy and Hun-
tington's chorea, on the other hand, have evident genetic origins."
It has been contended, based on a scientific analysis, that the
present sterilization laws do not achieve a permissable governmen-
tal objective in preventing incompetence.5 5 The inheritability of
mental deficiency has not been established to a reasonable medical
certainty, and the sterilization of individuals with noninheritable
conditions does not achieve a eugenic purpose.
The scientific dispute over the inheritability of certain mental
deficiencies, however, does not negate the constitutional validity of
all involuntary sterilization of the mentally handicapped. In Buck
v. Bell, the conclusion that the state's police power may be used to
prevent incompetence was forcefully stated by Justice Holmes.5 If
this rationale is followed, the compelling state interest in preventing
incompetence should allow the sterilization of individuals with
mental deficiencies only if they are inheritable. Since state regula-
tion must be narrowly drawn to encompass only the compelling
interest,57 involuntary sterilization of the mentally handicapped
pursuant to a compelling state interest in preventing mental defi-
ciency is constitutionally justifiable only in cases involving heredi-
tary forms of mental deficiency. With a statute formulated in those
terms, an adjudicatory body determining whether to sterilize a par-
ticular mental incompetent could and should rely on the latest sci-
51. Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DENVER L.J. 631, 642 (1969).
52. Id. at 647.
53. Id. at 639.
54. Id. at 642.
55. Id. at 646-47.
56. In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), the mentally retarded woman to be sterilized
was the offspring of a feeble-minded mother and was already the mother of a child believed
to be mentally retarded. Justice Holmes expressed the state interest involved by stating:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best of
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already
sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by
those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is
better for all of the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles
are enough.
Id. at 207.
57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
[Vol. 40
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entific information of the genetic inheritability of the individual's
particular abnormality. If it could not be established that the abnor-
mality is inheritable, then the sterilization could not be ordered.18
Other arguments based on a scientific analysis have also been
formulated to support the contention that involuntary sterilization
does not prevent incompetence. For example, it is argued that, as-
suming that a particular abnormality is inheritable, the number of
individuals actually manifesting the abnormality is very small com-
pared to the great number of carriers of the defective gene, 59 and for
a eugenic program to be effective in reducing the number of incom-
petent individuals, it must take into account these carriers as well.
Similarly, it is argued that abnormal genes producing mental defi-
ciency are constantly being generated by gene mutations, 0 and
therefore, the sterilization of all individuals manifesting or carrying
the mental deficiency would not produce a gene pool free of genes
producing mental deficiency. These arguments raise questions to
which there may be no definite answers.
If it is accepted that there is a compelling state interest in
preventing the birth of incompetent individuals, it can be argued
that any program which will significantly reduce the number of
incompetent individuals, even though it will not prevent all births
of incompetent individuals, is better than no reduction in the num-
ber of incompetents at all. A statutory involuntary sterilization pro-
gram when viewed in the context of the eugenics arguments, might
be classified as remedial legislation. Remedial legislation selects an
evil to be dealt with and attempts to apply a remedy to one or more
phases of the evil while neglecting the others. In effect, the reform
directed at the evil may take one step at a time." Remedial legisla-
tion of this type is generally upheld." However, it should be ac-
knowledged that most of the cases upholding remedial legislation63
are those in which only a "reasonable" or "rational" basis, rather
than the higher standard of a "compelling state interest," is needed
58. It should be noted that only a probability of inheritability may be required to justify
sterilization. The required probability may depend upon the state of medical knowledge
concerning genetic origins of mental deficiency, and the probabilities associated with the
mental abnormalities thought to be inheritable.
59. Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DENVER L.J. 631, 642-44
(1969).
60. Id. at 644.
61. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
62. Id.; Marshal v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974); McDonald v. Board of Election,
394 U.S. 802 (1969).
63. See cases cited note 62 supra.
1975]
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to uphold the classifications in the face of a challenge based on the
Equal Protection Clause. It may be argued, of course, that if pre-
venting incompetence is a compelling state interest, then a program
directed at significantly reducing the number of incompetents
should also be valid.
B. Parental Fitness
Preventing mental incompetence is not the only compelling
state interest which could justify involuntary sterilization. The wel-
fare of children born to the mentally handicapped is an alternate
state interest expressed in several state statutes. 4 The state's con-
cern for the welfare of its citizens clearly extends to future genera-
tions. 5 Evidence that a mentally handicapped parent would be un-
able to provide the proper care and environment to raise a child is
a valid state concern.66 However, if the justification for sterilization
is the welfare of future children, then a finding that the individual
suffers from an incurable mental deficiency should be required. If
the individual might be able to provide proper care for a child in
the future, there is no justification for involuntary sterilization.
The term "proper care" is, itself, too broad a standard. It allows
too much discretion in defining proper care to the adjudicatory body
determining if sterilization should be required. The statutory stan-
dard should define what constitutes proper care. For example, a
statutory definition of improper care in the context of inability to
provide the care that would prevent the child from becoming neg-
lected and dependent has been upheld as expressing a proper state
interest." Therefore, a statutory standard providing for the steriliza-
tion of an individual with an incurable mental deficiency whose
children would become neglected and dependent as a result of the
individual's inability, by reason of the mental deficiency, to provide
adequate care, should express a compelling state interest justifying
sterilization.
64. E.g., GA. CODE ANN., § 84-933 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT., § 35-39 (Supp. 1974);
ORE., REV. STAT., §§ 436.050-.070 (1973).
65. Cook v. State, 9 Ore. App. 224, 495 P.2d 768 (1972).
66. Id.
67. Id. Compare Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925),
which held invalid a statutory definition of improper care in the context of inability to support
children who would become public charges. The state created a class within a class and
invidiously discriminated between the mentally handicapped on the basis of wealth.
[Vol. 40
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss3/5
SEXUAL STERILIZATION
C. Welfare of the Individual to be Sterilized
Another alternative compelling state interest in involuntary
sterilization may be the welfare of the individual to be sterilized.
This interest is expressed in some states' involuntary sterilization
laws.68 This concern for the individual to be sterilized is evidenced
in Guardianship of Kemp, 9 where the trial court found that the
incompetent adult female sought to be sterilized would suffer a
severe impairment to her health if she became pregnant. If a statu-
tory scheme for sterilization is based on a state interest in the wel-
fare of the individual to be sterilized, an argument can be made for
the validity of such a scheme.
Cases outside of the sterilization area are indicative of the ap-
proach that may be taken. In Strunk v. Strunk,70 the mother (as
guardian) of a 27-year-old incompetent petitioned the court to allow
an operation to transplant a kidney of the ward to his 28-year-old
brother who was dying of a fatal kidney disease. The trial court
found that the operation would be greatly beneficial to the incompe-
tent because he was very emotionally and psychologically depen-
dent on his brother, and that his well-being would be jeopardized
more severely by the loss of his brother than by removal of the
kidney. The court upheld the authorization of the transplant. A
similar holding in Hart v. Brown 7' allowed the parents of a seven-
year-old minor to consent to a kidney transplant from the minor to
her twin sister. In that case, a psychiatrist testified that the opera-
tion would be of immense benefit to the donor because the donor
would be better off in a happy family than in a distressed family,
and that the death of the twin sister would be a great loss to the
donor.
Admittedly, the holdings of these cases only concerned an eq-
uity court's power to order removal of a kidney, and did not involve
the fundamental rights of the donors. They do, however, demon-
strate the concern of the state for the welfare of incompetent indi-
viduals. In Roe v. Wade72 the United States Supreme Court stated
that "a State may properly assert important interests in safeguard-
68. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN., §§ 64-10-1, 64-10-7 (1968); VA. CODE ANN., § 32-424
(Supp. 1974).
69. 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974). The court refused to order the
sterilization without specific statutory authorization.
70. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. App. 1969).
71. 29 Conn. Sup. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1975]
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ing health" of its citizens. 3 This rationale, coupled with the demon-
strated state concern for the physical, emotional, and psychological
welfare of incompetent individuals, should form a basis for a com-
pelling state interest in involuntary sterilization of the mentally
handicapped. 4
IV. VOLUNTARY VERSUS INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION
Involuntary sterilization is the sterilization of an individual
without the individual's consent, usually under compulsion exerted
by a state or federal administrative or adjudicatory body.- Volun-
tary sterilization, on the other hand, is undertaken with the in-
formed and competent consent of the individual76 and is the asser-
tion of a fundamental right by the individual.77 Without the in-
formed and competent consent of the individual, sterilization can-
73. Id. at 154.
74. In Roe, the Court concluded that a compelling state interest in the health of the
mother would justify the regulation of abortion, which is encompassed within the fundamen-
tal right to decide whether to have children, when the dangers of having an abortion were
greater than the dangers of childbirth.
75. This comment iloes not address the problem of sterilization without the consent of
the individual in the absence of governmental involvement or state action. If a sterilization
operation is performed without competent consent, then the doctor who performs the opera-
tion may be liable in tort for battery. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941);
Annots., 139 A.L.R. 1370 (1942), 76 A.L.R. 562 (1932).
76. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C, 1974). In that case, challenging
HEW's proposed regulations governing sterilizations under federally funded programs, Judge
Gesell determined that the family planning sections of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
602(a)(15), 708(a), 1396d(a)(4) (1970) and the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-5
(1970) allowed only voluntarily requested services, and therefore, only voluntary sterilization
was permissible under these statutes. Judge Gesell held that any person incompetent under
state law because of minority or mental disability lacks the capacity to consent to voluntary
sterilization.
Judge Gesell also concluded that federally assisted family planning sterilizations were
permissible only with the voluntary and knowing consent of individuals competent to give
consent. Addressing the question of informed consent, he stated that when important human
rights are involved, it
entails a requirement that the individual have at his disposal the information
necessary to make his decision and the mental competence to appreciate the signifi-
cance of that information.
Id. at 1202.
For an analysis of informed consent and what it encompasses, see Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Shartsis, Informed Consent: Some Problems Revisited, 51 NEB.
L,R. 527 (1972); Comment, Informed Consent As a Theory of Medical Liability, 1970 Wis.
L.R. 879; Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 695 (1957).
77. The decision whether to have children is a fundamental right, see note 24 and
accompanying text supra, and a voluntary decision to undergo sterilization is a decision
whether to have children. Therefore, it should also be a fundamental right.
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not be deemed voluntary. 8 If the sterilization is not voluntary, then
it may only be undertaken pursuant to procedure authorized by a
statute drawn " to encompass the constitutional standards required
for involuntary sterilization.
A. Consent for Minors and Mental Incompetents
Neither a minor nor a mentally incompetent individual can
give the competent consent necessary for voluntary sterilization."
Therefore, in states without involuntary sterilization laws or stat-
utes applicable to these individuals, they may not be sterilized un-
less someone can give the necessary consent for them.
As a general rule, a parent or guardian must consent to a surgi-
cal operation on a minor, and a physician has no legal right to
operate upon a minor without the consent of his parents or guard-
ian." There is some support for concluding that a parent or guardian
may consent to the sterilization of a minor. In In the Interest of
M.K.R.,82 the court indicated that it would not exclude sterilization
from the operations to which a parent could consent on behalf of a
minor. There are arguments, however, for excluding sterilization
from the operations to which a parent can consent for his children.
The sterilization of a minor irreversibly precludes the child from
exercising the fundamental right of deciding whether to have chil-
78. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974).
79. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
80. Minors: Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974). The court recognized
that the nearly universal rule was that a minor cannot give the competent consent necessary
for a medical operation, and stated that for sterilization, minors appear to lack the knowl-
edge, maturity, and judgment to consent to an irreversible operation involving a basic human
right of man. But compare Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash.2d 16, 431 P.2d 719 (1967), which
involved a suit for damages by an emancipated minor against the doctor who had performed
a vasectomy on him. The court held that an emancipated minor may validly consent to a
vasectomy. Mental incompetents: Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. App. 1968); Fra-
zier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
81. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1370 (1942).
See note 75 supra.
82. 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
83. Id. In this case, the mother of a 13-year-old mentally retarded girl petitioned the
juvenile court for permission to have the girl sterilized. In response to the mother's question
whether the supreme court would single out sterilization from the many medical and surgical
procedures to which parents could consent for their children, the court said:
The answer is "no". It is the petitioner who has singled out sterilization from those
other surgical procedures and asked the courts to "authorize," or put what peti-
tioner deems to be a necessary stamp of approval on her "best judgment" as to what
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dren. When these fundamental rights of the individual are involved
it may be argued that the decision should be left for the minor to
make upon reaching the age of legal discretion.8 4
Support for this argument can be based on a contention that
some parents do not always have the best interests of their children
in mind and are sometimes unreasonable in consenting to medical
operations for their children. An unreasonable and unconcerned
parent could deprive his child of the fundamental right to have
children by an arbitrary decision to have the child sterilized. Sev-
eral cases outside the sterilization area deal with a parent's right to
make decisions concerning the desirability of medical operations. 5
In In re Green,"5 a 16-year-old boy had suffered two attacks of po-
liomyelitis, which generated obesity problems, and suffered from a
94% curvature of the spine. The child's mother gave her consent to
an operation, but would not give her consent to blood transfusions
necessary for a successful operation because of her religious beliefs.
The court held that the state could not interfere with a parent's
control over her child's physical well-being by ordering blood trans-
fusions if the child's life was in no immediate danger and if the
state's intrusion conflicts with the parent's religious belief.87 In
Morrison v. State, 8 however, the court of appeals cited the Declara-
tion of Independence to the effect that every person has an inaliena-
ble right to life, and said that a parent cannot deny this right to an
infant by refusing to allow blood transfusions which would save the
child's life. Admittedly, a parent's decision to consent to the sterili-
zation of a minor does not abridge the minor's right to life, and the
point at which the parent's right to control medical operations for
his child, short of life or death situations, is unclear. Nevertheless,
84. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Supreme Court upheld the
prosecution of a Jehovah's Witness for allowing her 9-year-old niece to sell religious material.
The Court, in discussing the exercise of religious freedom and the harmful possibilities of
street preaching, stated:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they
have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice
themselves.
Id. at 170.
85. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Sup. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972); Morrison v. State, 252
S.W.2d 97 (K.C. Mo. App. 1952); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972); In re Hudson,
13 Wash.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
86. 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
87. But see In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.S.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918 (1972), which held that
the blood transfusions could be ordered where necessary to the success of the required surgery.
88. 252 S.W.2d 97 (K.C. Mo. App. 1952).
[Vol. 40
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sterilization irreversibly forecloses the minor's fundamental right to
have children at a time when the minor himself cannot competently
make that decision. The decision to be sterilized should be left for
the minor to make upon reaching the age of majority.89
The parent or guardian of a mentally handicapped individual
past the age of majority may not validly consent to his steriliza-
tion.9" Similarly, juvenile courts and courts with jurisdiction over
the mentally handicapped cannot order or grant permission for the
sterilization of the individual solely on the petition or request of a
parent or guardian.91 The rationale of the courts is that a mentally
handicapped individual may not be deprived of the fundamental
right to have children without statutory authority.9 2 In the absence
of such authority, the court lacks jurisdiction to issue such an order93
and compliance with procedural due process safeguards is not guar-
anteed.94 Undoubtedly, this rationale is justifiable. Sterilization of
a mentally handicapped individual, who cannot give competent
consent, should only be allowed under a statute complying with the
constitutional safeguards required for involuntary sterilization.
B. Voluntariness of Adult's Consent: Coercion
In Relf v. Weinberger," there was uncontroverted evidence that
a number of indigents were coerced into undergoing sterilization
operations by the threatened withdrawal of federally supported wel-
fare benefits. This coercion was allegedly done under the guise of
voluntary family planning services. Similarly, in recent years, there
have been several bills introduced in some state legislatures to intro-
duce sterilization into the states' public assistance programs. These
bills have taken three forms: (1) sterilization of a certain class of
public assistance recipients is made a condition to receiving public
assistance;96 (2) sterilization of a certain class of current public as-
89. Arguably, however, a minor could be sterilized under a state statute authorizing the
sterilization of a minor where the health and welfare of the minor necessitates sterilization.
90. Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. App. 1968) (dictum).
91. Wade v. Bethesda Hospital, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Guardianship of
Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); In the Interest of M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d
467 (Mo. En Banc 1974); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. App. 1968); Frazier v. Levi,
440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
92. See cases cited in note 91 supra.
93. Wade v. Bethesda Hospital, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); In the Interest of
M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
94. In the Interest of M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
95. 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974). See note 77 supra.
96. H. B. No. 591, Ohio 110th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1973), stated: "Any female
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sistance recipients is made a condition to receiving additional assis-
tance;9" and (3) incentive cash payments are made to public assis-
tance recipients or couples with poverty level incomes who undergo
sterilization."
When consent to sterilization is obtained by the threatened
withdrawal of welfare benefits, the consent should be deemed ne-
gated by the coercion exerted on the individual.9 A program requir-
ing the sterilization of a certain class of individuals as a condition
for receiving public assistance is indistinguishable from the consent
obtained by the threatened withdrawal of welfare benefits. The
coercive effect of conditioning public assistance on sterilization
should likewise negate any "voluntary" consent. In the second type
of proposed statute, however, which requires sterilization for the
receipt of additional public assistance and the third type which
utilizes additional assistance as an incentive to undergo steriliza-
tion, the coercive impact is not as obvious.
An argument can be made that a statutory scheme requiring
sterilization as a condition for receiving additional public assistance
has no coercive effect because there is no actual or threatened with-
drawal of existing welfare benefits; only additional benefits would
be denied an individual who refuses to be sterilized. However, the
definition of "voluntary" assumes an act which results from the
exercise of one's own free will ' that is not constrained, impelled,
or influenced by another. ' For the public assistance recipient, the
need of additional assistance for economic subsistence may override
receiving state aid for the support of more than two dependent, illegitimate children shall be
required to submit to sterilization procedures.
97. H. B. 1199, Indiana (1972) stated:
In all cases where an unwed mother applies to a county welfare board for
assistance for a child born out of wedlock and at the same time of said application
she is receiving assistance for one or more other children, of said mother, born out
of wedlock, before assistance may be granted for said child, the said mother may
be required to submit to the sexual sterilization operation.
98. H.B. 1022, Illinois (1973), provided for vasectomies and tubal ligations at no cost
and a cash payment of $100 for a man or woman with income of less than $3000 per year.
H.B. No. 339, New Hampshire (1973), provided for a $1,000 incentive award for welfare
recipients who undergo voluntary sterilization operations.
99. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974). See note 76 supra. After
concluding that only voluntary sterilization was permissible under federal family planning
programs, Judge Gesell discussed the threatened withdrawal of federally funded welfare
benefits and concluded: "Even a fully informed individual cannot make a 'voluntary'
decision concerning sterilization if he has been subjected to coercion from doctors or project
officers." Id. at 1203.
100. Reif v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D.D.C. 1974).
101. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2564 (1961).
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the exercise of his free will. The recipient may feel compelled to
undergo sterilization if he thinks the additional assistance is a ne-
cessity. 102
Likewise, it can be argued that the use of incentive awards to
encourage public assistance recipients to undergo voluntary sterili-
zation does not coerce or influence the individual's exercise of free
will. The incentive award is an addition to the subsistence award
provided by the basic program. Again, however, if the individual
thinks the award is necessary for his economic subsistence, he may
subordinate the exercise of his free will to his concern for his basic
economic needs.'0 3 Obviously, it is difficult to conclude whether the
consent to sterilization under these two schemes is voluntary or
involuntary. The voluntariness of consent in these instances turns
on factual determinations which should be considered on a case by
case basis.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, some broad conclusions concerning involuntary
sterilization may be stated. The state may undertake a program of
involuntary sterilization for certain classes of individuals to achieve
a compelling state interest. Procedural due process safeguards must
accompany the program of involuntary sterilization. Such a pro-
gram must be undertaken pursuant to a statute authorizing the
sterilization which is narrowly drawn to encompass the compelling
state interest and which provides objective standards and reasona-
ble guidelines to govern the determination of whether a particular
individual may be sterilized. State concerns which may rise to the
level of a compelling state interest include: (1) the prevention or
reduction of mental incompetence which may be accomplished by
102. In Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974), Judge Gesell, in formulat-
ing a definition for "voluntary" which "assumes an exercise of free will and clearly precludes
the existence of coercion or force," id. at 1202, cited United States v. Johnson, 452 F.2d 1363
(D.C.C. 1971). One of the issues involved in Johnson was whether the defendant had con-
sented to the taking of a photograph from which he was identified. The photograph was taken
when he voluntarily went to the police station to find a friend. As for the defendant's consent
to taking the photograph, the court stated:
His attorney reported that Johnson stated "he had little choice but to do it." Such
a statement does not convey the defendant's voluntary agreement free from duress
or coercion.
452 F.2d at 1372. If this rationale is applied to a public assistance recipient who feels that he
has little choice but to undergo sterilization to obtain the additional assistence needed for
economic subsistence, then the consent to the sterilization cannot be deemed voluntary.
103. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
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sterilizing individuals with inheritable mental deficiencies; (2) the
parental fitness of the mentally handicapped and the welfare of
children born to them; and (3) the welfare of the individual to be
sterilized.
In the instances where statutes do not govern the sterilization,
an individual's consent to the sterilization is necessary to preclude
an objection to the sterilization on the ground that it does not com-
ply with the constitutional standards required for involuntary steri-
lization. There must be informed consent given by a competent
individual or someone who may legally consent for him. Such con-
sent cannot be coerced by a threat of economic deprivation.
JOSEPH D. BAKER
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